Abstract
Introduction
The example of Asian Russia provides a view of Russian institutional reform and economic performance from a regional perspective. The bottom-up, regional perception of how Russia's central government shapes incentives and regulates economic outcomes provides a counterpoint to the views from Moscow. In spite of uncertainty about investment, a burgeoning Asia will turn to Russian energy as a driver of future growth.
However, the disparity between real per capita incomes and human development indicators in Siberia and in European Russia raises the question of whether residents of the energy-rich provinces of Siberia will benefit from Russia's export of energy and other resources products to the global market.
More seriously, the evidence in this essay of widespread illegal exportation of timber and fish in two of Siberia's core industries tells us that the Russian institutions for management of these industries are not working. Whenever the rules of the game as legislated and what people are actually doing shows such strong variance, then something 3 is wrong-institutions and enforcement are not incentive compatible. A large informal economy, high levels of corruption, and high rates of violence are all symptoms of weak state capacity.
The case of Siberia invites us to explore the sources of misgovernance and the possible remedies. We argue in the cases of forests and fish that establishment of private property rights in resources is needed to create incentives for efficient resource use and to reduce the opportunities for rent-seeking by authorities.
Moreover, using Asian Russia as a case study of regional development raises the issues of scale and decentralization. How should Siberia's resources and people bew linked with domestic and global markets? How can Russia achieve flexible and efficient structural change when resources are owned and managed by a government centered in European Russia while administration is delegated to sub-national authorities in Russia's remote provinces. The issue of efficient decentralization confronts other large, unwieldy governments.
We hypothesize that effective fiscal decentralization would make regional administrators more accountable to regional tax-payers, providing greater opportunity to monitor and enforce market-supporting public governance. In spite of the incentives for protectionism, the need for greater integration into the global market and greater local flexibility and accountability is overwhelming.
Why are some countries so much more productive than others? Economists note that economic well-being depends on the quality of a country's institutions. The central hypothesis of the modern theory of institutional economics is that the primary, fundamental determinant of a country's long-run economic performance is its social infrastructure. This view was first documented by Robert Hall and Charles Jones. They defined social infrastructure to be the institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. Those underlying incentives could encourage productive activities such as the accumulation of skills or the development of new goods and production techniques or could encourage predatory behavior such as rent-seeking, corruption, and theft. In their empirical work, they demonstrated the close association between measures of social infrastructure and per capita output (Hall and Jones, 1999) .
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In high income countries, rule of law prevails, investors feel secure about property rights, private incentives are aligned with social goals, monetary and fiscal policies are consistent with macroeconomic balance, individuals have means of moderating risks, and citizens enjoy civil liberties and political participation. In low income countries, these arrangements are absent or incomplete. On these criteria, Siberia has weak social institutions and low levels of economic welfare in spite of its vast resource wealth.
As will be discussed later in the chapter, in the tsarist and Soviet eras, Siberia's remote location, ethnic diversity, and riches in natural resources fostered a colonial relationship between government policy-makers at the center and local communities.
This implicit colonialism, laid on top of existing centralized, authoritarian structures, encouraged institutional arrangements designed to extract income from the region for the benefit of outside policy-makers and elites at the center.
In the Soviet period, the GULAG system became the core of Soviet development strategy for building Siberia. In 1938, and again in 1949-53 , the GULAG population peaked at more than 2 million persons and Siberia became the graveyard for vast numbers of victims of Stalin's terror (Khalevnyuk 2001, 116) .
Still, the forced relocation of factories beyond the Urals allowed the Soviet Union to withstand invasion in World War II and spurred the growth of cities in Siberia. Yet, over subsequent decades when the central government's megaprojects in Siberia were implemented by industrial ministries, the primacy of political over economic criteria and the lack of realistic measures of opportunity costs meant that, on the eve of the break-up of the former Soviet Union, everyone was in the wrong place and doing the wrong thing.
The legacies of Siberia's top-down control persist today. Today, regional actors still view federal authorities as remote colonial masters seeking to extract the last ounce of rent from the region's resource wealth while sharing few of the benefits with the region. The conflict of interests between federal and regional authorities contributes to biased information flows, tax evasion, corruption, and a large informal economy. All of these symptoms of bad governance impede growth-supporting development. The fact that future, efficient developments in Siberia will be linked to a considerable withdrawal of people makes the task of managing structural change doubly difficult.
More seriously, some policy-makers fear that measures increasing efficient, crossboarder integration of Siberia's land and resources with the economies of its neighbors--China, Japan, and Korea--will leave Russia vulnerable to hold-up or threaten Russian sovereignty over Siberia.
In their drive to settle Siberia with Europeans, the Soviet state subsidized large permanent settlements in some of the remotest and least hospitable sites in the world, so, today, the availability of market alternatives is finally generating a rapid and efficient exodus of people from areas where work is unrewarded and life is difficult (Hill and Gaddy 2003, Mikhailova 2004) . But falling population again fosters fears of loss of central control over Russia's Asian hinterland.
The challenge for Siberia's future is how to bring its natural resources and population efficiently into the global economy at the same time that inefficient monocities are downsized or closed. I argue here that efficient, resource-based development of Siberia will require legislative and administrative changes allowing efficient, marketbased exercise of property rights in agricultural land, forests, and fisheries (Fortescue 2009 ). It will require fiscal and political decentralization to give local taxpayers the ability to monitor and invest in state capacity and it will require full integration with the dynamic states of Asia.
The recent literature on economic development of Asian Russia provides case studies of the economic issues raised here. Recent literature on Siberian development draws on a vast library of materials on Siberia's resource wealth and history. The historical roots of Siberian growth are documented in stories of heroism and despair-the construction of Magnitogorsk and tragic history of the GULAG (Kotkin 1991 , Naumov 2006 , Stephan 1994 , Applebaum 2003 , Khalevnyuk 2001 ).
The opening of Asian Russia to the global market generated a substantial body of research on the structural change that Siberia would face once its producers had to compete with global suppliers in the domestic market and had to pay world prices for their inputs (Hill and Gaddy 2003, Thornton 2006) . Much of this recent literature focuses on the development and potential of Russia's resource base in energy and metals (Bradshaw 2010 , Gaddy and Ickes 2005 , Moe and Kryukov 2010 , Poussenkova 2007 , Thornton 2010 ).
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The potential role that dynamic Asian economies could play in linking Asian Russia to resources users and markets in the Pacific has generated a substantial body of literature on the promise and perils of international economic cooperation (Bradshaw 2001 , Mikheeva 2004 , Minakir 1999 , Thornton and Ziegler 2002 , Thornton 2010 ). Yet, that literature, too, emphasizes the impact that a rigid an unstable political system poses to the prospects for economic integration.
The Geography of Siberia
Two-thirds of Russian territory lies in Asia. Siberia stretches more than 3,700 miles from the Urals to Kamchatka. With the Arctic Ocean to the north, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Mongolia, China, and Korea to the south, and the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan to the east, Siberia's 5.3 million square miles of territory dwarfs European Russia.
Siberia is legendary for cold, harsh winters. In Sakha, winter temperatures can fall to minus 71 degrees C. In the permafrost in summer, water accumulates in swamps that breed clouds of mosquitoes and other insects. Along the Arctic Ocean, lies the Arctic tundra, covered with lichen, moss, and sedge. South of this frozen land is the taiga, the dense boreal forest of larch, spruce, pine, and fir that first attracted Russian trappers and explorers and now supports Russia's export of hard wood to China. Coniferbroadleaved forests grow below the taiga zone in highly diverse temperate forests in the Far East (Newell 2004, 5) .
Siberia's History Early Expansion
In the 15 th century, Tatar-Mongol invasions threatened Russia's borderlands.
However, military victories under Ivan the IV transferred control of eastern lands to the Russian Crown. Conquered territories were established as land grants to important military generals and families close to the Tsar.
However, early movement of Russians into Siberia was limited. It wasn't until after completion of the Trans Siberian railroad beyond Lake Baikal that the flow of immigrants migrating to Siberia became a flood. In 1897 population was 5.8 million; by 1905, it approached 9.4 million persons (Naselenie 1956, 26) .
In the 17 th Century, the administration of Siberia was centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic. The unlimited powers of the military governors and the large distances 7 from the center provided ample opportunity for abuse. In the 17 th century, the Siberian administrative system was characterized by -feeding‖ (kormlenie). The governors received no salaries from the state but could collect bribes and kick-backs from businesses, traders, and lower-level officials on their territories.
The Stolypin reforms of 1906 improved the legal framework to support private property in land, the growth of commercialized, scientific farming, and the unitization of private farmlands. International trade in farm products more than doubled in the following decade, with new production from Siberia contributing some of the largest increases.
As the Twentieth Century began, electricity from industrial hydroelectric stations in Siberia changed life in cities. Opening Russia to the modern world gave foreign investors access to Siberian markets. Siberians produced less than one-twenty-fifth of Russian exports in 1910 but received one-seventh of its foreign imports in the form of British mining machinery and consumer goods, US farm equipment, and German machinery and electrical equipment (Lincoln 1994, 285) .
In 1884, when St. Petersburg recognized the geostrategic significance of its Far
East, it created a new Priamur governor-generalship, sited in Khabarovsk (Stephan, 1994, 60 (Kotkin 1991, 209 ). Yet free and forced laborers alike paid unbelievable human costs from the deprivation, overwork, and inefficiency of the forced industrialization program.
In spite of the hunger, cold, and poor skills of the workers, the blast furnaces and rolling mills were mostly in place by 1937. In 1937-38, the Great Purge hit Magnitogorsk, decimating the factory's top level party leaders, factory managers, and cultural figures (Kotkin 1991, 210 (Kotkin 1991, 1 ). Yet, with the largest assemblage of obsolete equipment in the country, the factory's blast furnaces filled the air with thick, multicolored smoke. A reported 223,000 residents-34% of adults and 67% of children-suffered from respiratory illnesses (Feshbach and Friendly 1991, 92) . In 1989, in the local stores, one could find milk, eggs, bread, and low-quality fish, but scarce items, such as sugar, meat, butter, and sausages were rationed, (Feshbach and Friendly 1991, 125 (Gaidar 2007, 110) .
The expansion of energy production came largely from investment in West 
The Role of Forced Labor in Building Siberia
In 1929, Stalin's Politburo approved a resolution -On the Utilization of the Labor of Criminal Prisoners,‖ that provided for prison camps in remote areas to colonize and exploit the regions' natural resources (Khalevnyuk 2001, 113) . In 1930, the OGPU began building a White Sea-Baltic canal with penal labor. In April 1932, a camp was established on the Kolyma in Magadan, where gold extraction and non-ferrous mining were developed. Later that year, construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) in the Far East began. The core of the Gulag economy was large-scale projects, usually construction, based on a steady supply of workers. Yet, the camp inmates were a minority in the Soviet penal system, which also included special settlements and colonies.
Khalevnyuk reports that in January 1933, prison camps housed 334,000 inmates, while another 1,142,000 people were re-settled in special settlements (Khalevnyuk 2001, 116) .
In the Far East alone, 63,000 inmates built railroads, mined coal, constructed the shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and mined the rich gold deposits in Magadan. The Magadan, a new and much harsher camp boss took over, arresting most of the previous administrators along with the technical specialists and engineers who had managed to deliver gold to the center in earlier years. The number of prisoners grew, but production lagged. The NKVD was unable to cope with the huge influx of new political prisoners.
Between August 1937 and November 1938 almost 700,000 people were executed. -A significant portion of them, the lists of those executed show, were able-bodied men, highly qualified specialists and workers, who were constantly in short supply at NKVD projects,‖ (Khalevnyuk 2001, 118) .
The appalling inhumanity and brutality of Russia's GULAG is hard to comprehend. The sheer waste of human lives on tasks that failed or had no purpose is even sadder. Efforts to use forced labor to construct railroads in Siberia, such as the BAM were largely unsuccessful.
Today, in the reform era, in Magadan, the production of gold and silver has grown while population continues to fall. In 2010, the Magadan region produced 17 tons of gold and 677.8 tons of silver. However, a visitor to the city still finds architecture reminiscent of a decaying prison and a population who view their work life in the Far
East as a temporary tour of duty. Outside the city, the landscape was once a setting of forested river valleys and abundant wildlife. However, between the 1930s and 1980s, the clear-cutting of the region's larch and cedar denuded the hillsides and destroyed salmonspawning beds. Today, the remaining forests are in inaccessible areas or in protected forest zones.
The Military Defense of Siberia and the Russian Far East
During the 
Siberia and the Far East on the Eve of Reform
In the late 1980's, on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Siberia and the Far East faced conflicting forces. The legacy of planning meant that many of Siberia's industries could not survive in a competitive economy. Siberia's mono-cities were placed in remote, hostile environments-an archipelago in the wilderness. Once the Russian economy opened to global markets, large sectors of its economy and a large share of its capital stock would be unprofitable at world prices. On the other hand, as export through centralized government channels fell, opening up opportunities for elites to move trade revenues off shore, short-run capital flight stimulated demand for resources that could be sold on the world market.
On the eve of its break-up, the Soviet economy was in crisis. Goods disappeared from shops. Real GDP declined 15 percent. The government deficit rose to 16.5 percent of GDP. In dollar terms, exports fell 40 percent, imports 84 percent.
In outlying regions of Russia, the consequences of repressed inflation, capital flight, and institutional collapse were easy to see. In September, 1989, a visitor arriving As capital flight reduced the inputs available for domestic production and consumption, production links unraveled. In January, 1991, delivery of spare parts and replacement equipment for the Khabarovsk power station was interrupted, leaving half of the city's 680,000 people without heat, lights, or water for two months in sub-zero temperatures (Thornton 2001) .
Demographic and Structural Change in Siberia
Early transition was a period of chaos in Siberia. Closure of military bases, drastic cuts in production of military hardware, and reductions in central subsidies led to unemployment and a collapse in incomes. Although nominal incomes of workers in Asian Russia exceeded European incomes, real income was lower, due to higher costs of living. Enterprises accumulated large payments, wage, and tax arrears.
The prospect of opening the Russian economy to the world market and adjusting to world market prices revealed large economic distortions. At world terms of trade, Siberia's raw materials had far greater value relative to manufactured goods outside rather than inside the country. Assessed at world prices, the value of domestic output would not cover the cost of purchased raw materials alone, even if existing labor and capital prices were zero. These industries had negative value-added at world prices. In a 1996 study, Thornton estimated apparent competitiveness of industrial sectors in the Far East at world prices. Four sectors-food processing (fishing), forest products, light industry, and chemicals had negative value added sectors at world prices. They would be bankrupt unless they could improve underlying technologies. Three additional sectorsagriculture, ferrous metals, and coal-could not cover existing wages at world prices.
Two of the region's main export sectors, forestry and fishing, would become unprofitable once they paid the full price of energy (Thornton Structural 1996) . However, privatization of medium-sized firms was subject to intense competition between territorial and central authorities. Large firms in energy, metallurgy, and the military industries remained in state hands and usually were privatized at the center.
About three-quarters of the small service firms were privatized by commercial bidding, and in larger municipalities, privatization provided a basis for genuine competition.
Voucher privatization of large-scale firms proceeded more slowly in Siberia and the Far East than in other regions because of the large shares of firms providing infrastructure services, producing military products, or extracting state-owned resources. Nevertheless, by 1994, in two-thirds of firms, employees had opted for a variant of privatization that allowed managers and employees to acquire 51 percent of the voting stock of their firms, bidding with vouchers (Minakir 1999, 89-96) .
By 1995, most of the large firms in Asian Russia were under hybrid ownership with shares of stock held by managers, employees, members of the territorial elite, outside owners, and the state. Initially, ownership was exercised by enterprise managers and territorial authorities, but, gradually outside investors from Moscow-based holding companies began to acquire ownership of firms with valuable export products.
The parceling out of licenses and rights to develop resource reserve in Siberia and the Far East occurred in opaque processes, often at the center. For example in oil extraction, Rosneftegas, the successor to the former USSR Ministry of Petroleum, was forced to give up its many subsidiaries in favor of new vertically-integrated oil companies in the 1990's but then regained assets through nationalization in the following decade.
Agricultural privatization proved illusive. Instead of providing a framework for ownership of family farms, local collective farms were transformed into huge joint stock companies managed by former collective farm managers and local government officials.
Collective farm members received nominal stock shares with few effective ownership rights. In a study based on interviews with territorial officials and small peasant farmers, Duncan and Ruetschle found that farmers in the Far East who attempted to set up family farms faced tax obligations exceeding farm revenue (Duncan and Ruetschle 2002, 201) .
If they ceased production to avoid taxes, territorial land use committees confiscated their land for non-production. The process of privatization of land in the Far East saw more than half of the arable land move into land redistribution funds controlled by the regional governments. Today, these territorial land redistribution funds are leased, often to peasants from neighboring China.
Initially, liberalization of markets and privatization of firms attracted widespread foreign interest. In export industries, such as oil extraction, international oil companies sought partnerships with the emerging vertically-integrated domestic producers. Yet, in an unpredictable regulatory and tax environment, most of the early foreign direct investments proved unprofitable-sometimes spectacularly so, although British Petroleum in Siberia, and Shell and Exxon on Sakhalin undertook successful, long-term investment into new capacities. In the decentralized forestry and fishing industries, discussed later, foreign investors, notably Japanese suppliers of modern technology, were expropriated repeatedly (Thornton Strategies 1996) .
Economic and Social Change of Transition
On the eve of transition, industrial production in Siberia and the Far East was capital intensive. Thus, per capita gross regional product in the territories with a large manufacturing and mining base exceeded the all-Russian average. However, the drastic decrease in Russian demand for military and investment products after 1992 and the collapse of vertical supply links across separate countries with the break-up of the former Soviet Union led to drastic declines in economic activity. In 1999, gross regional product (GRP) in the Far East stood at 42 percent of the 1990 level (Mikheeva 2002, 91) .
Between 1994 and 2008, most Siberian provinces recorded larger drops in per capita GRP and showed slower recoveries than the all-Russian average.
Regional performance was heterogeneous, with Tyumen and Sakhalin accounting for nine and six times greater industrial output per person than other territories.
[Insert Table: Ratio of Per Capita GRP to Average GRP 1990 -2008 [Insert Graph: Per Capita GRP and Fixed Capital in Siberia and the Far East
2008]
With the drastic declines in industrial output, between 1992 and 1998, the share of the population with income less than a subsistence minimum rose from about one-quarter to more than one-third. However, the situation began to improve after 2000 as Siberian production responded to a four-fold depreciation in the ruble exchange rate, a remonetization of the domestic economy, and rapid growth in world demand for Russia's exports. Further, the drastic change in exchange rates allowed a recovery of importsubstituting domestic production and increased the competitiveness of Russia's exports. 
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Although Soviet factory whaling collapsed in 1992, the native people resumed fishing in traditional wood-framed boats covered with walrus skin, manned by six or seven-man crews. Shortly, they received subsistence whaling permits to harvest about 120 grey whales and two bow whales annually. Today, the International Whale Commission has allocated a shared harvest of 280 bowhead and 620 grey whales to Chukotka's native people and Alaska's Inuit for non-commercial subsistence whaling.
Until recently, Chukotka's industry was poorly developed. Industrial production relied on mining, mainly gold mining. In 1998, the territory produced 6 tons of gold.
However a special regime, introduced by then-Governor Roman Abramvich that gave According to his spokesperson at Millhouse Capital, Sibneft and Abramovich, personally, spent more than $2 billion to maintain and improve the region.
He offered relocation grants to pensioners seeking to leave the region. Living standards improved and infrastructure, schools, and housing were improved. Anadyr became a cheerful town whose Soviet-era apartments were repainted in primary colorsred, blue, and yellow. 
State Ownership and Administration of Russian Forests
Today, Asian Russia's comparative advantage in the Pacific market is, first, energy-oil, natural gas, coal-and secondly, metals. However, these sectors are capitalintensive, providing modest long-run employment. Siberia's other resource industries, forest products, agriculture, and fishing, will continue to play major roles as employers in Siberia and the Far East, although both forestry and fisheries face rapid draw-down of stocks.
The timber and forest products industries have been a source of long-run
employment. Yet, a look at government management in forestry tells us that the current arrangements fail to provide incentives for efficient resource use and long-run sustainability, fail to safeguard protected forests and watersheds, and provide ample opportunity for illegal logging and self-dealing by administrative authorities. is to benefit from harvest of its vast forest resources, then its framework of land laws will need to be re-drafted to provide long-term stability for harvesters. Further, the capacity of all of the state agencies empowered to implement forest law will need substantial improvement.
Russia contains almost 25% of the world's forests. Along with Indonesia and Malaysia, it retains forest lands in government control. In the Soviet era, the forest products industry enjoyed stable, high levels of production and produced mainly for the domestic market.
In the State, the superior holding company, and the operating personnel of the original production units. In practice, the State shares, which varied from 15 to 51 percent of the total, were managed by officials of the provincial government and the provincial resource ministries.
As administrative agencies took over the control of resources from the subordinate production units, many of the underlying production organizations disintegrated. Their equipment and personnel were decentralized to small logging enterprises linked to individual towns and villages. Today, this structure of a few large timber holding companies with hybrid private and state control combined with many small, inefficient logging firms persists in most regions. With the exception of Irkutsk, where processing of wood products remains important, the share of domestic wood processing fell steadily.
Thus, today, Russia is the world's largest exporter of round wood, accounting for 43% of coniferous and 42% of non-coniferous exports in international markets. The industry employs almost 900,000 workers, with more than three-quarters of its employees in Siberia and the Far East. In 2010, the largest purchasers of timber were China (37% of round wood), Finland (32%), and Japan (14%). The structure of the industry is decentralized, with many small logging companies operating in each region. Some of 25 these companies sell directly to foreign producers; others deliver round wood to the large intermediaries, described above (Makela 2009 ).
[Insert Table: Potential for Export of Forest Products in Asian Russia]
The management of forest use is carried out by two vertical authorities: a provincial administration and the federal administration subordinate to the Ministry of Natural Resources. The provincial administration implements the licensing of forest stands, the collection of use fees, and the enforcement of social obligations, but its processes are subject to oversight by the federal authorities.
Siberia has the largest stands of timber and the largest potential physical harvest of any of Russia's regions (Eastin and Turner 2009 ). Yet, only half of potential harvest is actually cut in Siberia and 42% in the Far East. The disparity reflects many factors that increase costs, including lack of infrastructure, high transport costs to bring logs to markets, short harvesting seasons in the North, and a lack of processing capacity to turn round wood into processed products (Simeone 2011) . Costs of felling round wood in
Siberia are approximately two times higher than in Northwest Russia (Sheingaz 2002).
On the other hand, illegal felling of timber, which is widespread, means that actual harvests in the region exceed reported harvest, sometimes by vast amounts.
With weak governance, Moscow's strategy to foster higher value added processing of round wood by imposing export taxes on the export of logs, instead creates incentives for evasion. Export taxes were set at 20% of value in 2007, rising to 25% in 2008. Export taxes were scheduled to escalate to 80%, but a drastic fall in official export quantities and an escalation of illegal exports put further tax increases on hold.
A few Chinese firms are beginning to invest in wood processing mills in the Russian Far East, encouraged by a formal Russian-Chinese agreement. However, a more noteworthy development has been the emergence of illegal harvesting and illegal export of logs to China. Timber industry experts estimate the value of illegal exports at about 25 billion rubles, or $1 billion, annually. In spite of a proliferation of documentation and formal monitoring, industry observers estimate that 50 to 70 percent of timber exported from Primorye and southern Khabarovsk has been felled illegally (Lebedev 2005 , Wikileaks 2010 ). Today, China is Russia's largest trading partner (9.5%), leading the Netherlands (9.3%), Germany (8.3%, and Ukraine (6.9%). Within Asia, Russia's top three trading partners are China, Japan, and South Korea, with China playing the dominant role.
[Insert Table: Russian Trade with Northeast Asia 2010]
The commodity mix of Russia's exports has become increasingly resource-based.
In 2010, fuel and energy accounted for 67.5 percent of exports followed by ferrous and non-ferrous metals (10.6%), chemicals (6.2%), and machinery and equipment, including military equipment, (5.4%). Turning to the structure of exports from Siberia and the Far East, the largest reported exports from Siberia's 2010 total of $30.8 billion were fuels, metal and metallurgy, chemicals, forest products, and machinery.
[Insert Table: In the past decade, the ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka in Primorye became major importers of Japanese and South Korean vehicles and parts. In December, 2008, the imposition of high tariffs on foreign automobiles led to violent protests on the streets of Vladivostok.
Development Initiatives from the Center
The Primorye's main city, Vladivostok, is located on the Golden Horn Bay, a deep natural harbor surrounded by steep hills. In the Soviet era, Vladivostok was a closed city, not only to foreigners, but to Soviet citizens as well. The Pacific Fleet was based in the city, nuclear submarines were built in a nearby town, and a major submarine base occupied the beachfront a few miles northeast of town.
Perestroika turned the region upside down. New organizations, foreign trading companies and export cooperatives, sought access to the Trans-Siberian and the ports in order to move raw materials offshore onto the world market. Gangs of toughs hung around the ports and the airport, watching over the movement of contraband.
Vladivostok was the center of the Wild East. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, thousands of troops were demobilized. Coming home without jobs or money, they found employment in -mafias,‖ local protection rackets that preyed on the new small businesses or national mafias that exported resources, imported Japanese cars, and controlled domestic trade.
After economic reform, Primorye suffered through a decade of conflict over ownership and control of economic assets and political conflict with the center. With the onset of privatization, networks of officials in Moscow sent teams to the territory to assure central control of regional assets, while local officials sought to separate local factories and facilities from ministerial subordination to assert local control. Governor Evgeniy Nazdratenko, earned the enmity of the Center by seeking to gain local control Bay is open year round. To the east, the city of Nakhodka has four ports, including a large containerized port, Vostochny. In 2010, the imposition of high import tariffs on foreign automobiles generated riots in Vladivostok, where sales and service of Japanese and Korean autos are an important source of employment.
In the Soviet era, Primorye's largest industries were fish and seafood (43 %) and machine building (24%), largely military production. However, after reform, only one of the Far East's 32 military enterprises managed to develop civilian products for the domestic market, although some survived by exporting. In the fishery, the large Russian fishing fleet ceased using Far East ports in Russia in the face of risk of hold-up. Instead, catcher-processor vessels put in at Busan, in South Korea, for maintenance.
Today, Primorye's future is linked to its role as a maritime province. Yet, private economic activity will depend on its ability to fuction as a trade and transport node and on the contribution that the Pacific fishery makes to its economy.
Management of Russia's Pacific fishery presents a paradoxical picture. On the one hand, regional producers have acquired large modern trawling fleets built in the shipyards of Norway and Spain, financed through long term leases with Western banks.
On the other hand, the most valuable commercial stocks of fish have been reduced through over-fishing so that production has stabilized at about half of the levels of the 32 1980s. Procedures for access to fishing quotas have changed repeatedly and remain opaque.
Before reform, Far East fishing organizations were enormous, self-sufficient bureaucracies that controlled their own fishing ports, ship repair yards, construction organization, housing, and social overhead facilities. Privatization converted these bureaucracies into a mixture of joint stock companies and state enterprises. On Sakhalin, small, entrepreneurial fishing firms emerged. On Kamchatka, the former state fishing administration retained its organizational structure. Individual independent firms participated as members of territorial associations in lobbying for access to quotas.
Until 2004, the State Fishing Committee controlled access to fishing quotas, with about one-third of the rights to total allowable catch sold at auction and the rest acquired through negotiated procedures. Then, control of quotas was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and regulations were adopted to increase the role of on-shore processing.
As the industry re-directed its sales to the international market, there were Attempts by the government to enforce sales to domestic processors misfired since uncertainty blocked investment in domestic on-shore processing facilities, while both Russian and foreign fishing interests moved their assets and activities to the international market. Thus, with uncertainty about the procedures and costs of gaining long-run rights to fish, in an environment with high political risk, today, fishing enterprises focus on short-run profits, held off-shore, rather than having incentives to build a stable domestic industry.
Institutional arrangements in the west to limit over-fishing and foster efficient harvesting establish long-term tradable rights to harvest shares of a total allowable catch 33 as a solution to common pool resource problems. These property rights, called individual tradable quotas (ITQs) capture resource rents by reducing the race to fish and move property rights to the more efficient harvesters. Using evidence from international fisheries in developed countries, Grainger and Costello show that that stronger property rights lead to higher potential asset values and generate a more efficient structure of investment in resource use (Grainger and Costello 2011) .
Establishment of ITQs in Russian fisheries would give the Far Eastern economy a secure framework for maintaining a valuable fishing industry, but, at present, they are far from that goal. Large amounts of illegal harvest promoted by corrupt enforcement and risks of hold-up replicate the disarray in governance of other publicly-managed resources.
Conclusions: the Future of Asian Russia
Development of each of the industries discussed here requires secure access to Siberia's resources and close links to the international market. But, today, access to resources depends on close personal relationships to political authorities who may or may not remain in office to provide privileged access in the long-run. Thus, in the short-run, the government management of resource wealth creates opportunities for corruption and incentives for theft of resources and weakens the motivation to invest in efficient technologies and conserve stocks for future use.
The obvious solution in each case is the design of stable, long-term property rights in resource stocks. However, the opposition to private property comes from all sides.
There is the myriad of authorities whose jobs and opportunities for self-dealing would be at risk, the existing insider firms that enjoy privileged access to valuable stocks, and the citizens who observe that past privatizations put assets in the hands of insider elites with little benefit to the general population. For villagers without access to alternatives, illegal logging is viewed as their only short-run survival strategy.
Even with stronger property rights legislation and more consistent application of the rules by the authorities, and even with better physical infrastructure and reliable social services, there is likely to be a continued outflow of people to European Russia and a retreat from the Far North.
If Siberia's residents hope to rely on rapid growth of Asia as a locomotive for Russian growth, then the government will need to establish stronger links for business cooperation with all of the countries of Asia and, particularly, with China, Japan, and South Korea. Federal policies to support domestic manufacturing in European Russia, such as high import tariffs and export taxes place an impossible burden on citizens in remote Asian Russia. An alternative federal policy, modeled on the Chinese example, would be establishment of free-trade economic zones in the Far East that would encourage producers on the Pacific to integrate their economies with their Asian neighbors and give them control over local tax revenues to build local infrastructure.
Russia's main impediment to fuller integration into world markets outside of its role as an energy supplier remains the weakness of its institutional governance. Perhaps, as the recipient of vast resource rents, the Russian Federation government has less need to build the complex institutions of a well-functioning society in order to collect tax revenue, but in failing to build the legal and administrative capacity to enforce contracts, support markets, and protect property rights, it is unable to respond to the opportunities of Asian growth. Centralizing tax and tariff revenues in Moscow creates incentives for evasion.
Can Russia build the capacity to participate in expanding Pacific markets? Its fuel and energy will flow to Asian markets in growing quantities. However, if the surpluses from oil and gas flow to Moscow, then Asian Russia may remain a relatively underdeveloped colony with an obsolete, decaying infrastructure, poor social services, and staggering corruption. Thus, Moscow's vulnerability in seeking to manage its Asian periphery results not from foreign threats but, rather, from its own institutional weaknesses and its own failure to strengthen its underlying governance of economic activity. 
